West Africa 2022: Coups, Contracts, and Criminal Governance ARCON – Series on Corruption, Crime and Harm Networks A publication by SciVortex Corp.
- ARCON
- Jul 9
- 3 min read
This article is based on structured evidence extracted from over 12,000 news articles published by The Guardian, consolidated by the ARCON platform (Automated Robotics for Criminal Observation Network). Using VORISOMA, ARCON models interactions between social agents, criminal markets, corruption structures, and patterns of victimization.
As part of the analytical process, an initial dataset review was conducted to identify periods with the highest availability and relevance of structured information. Based on this assessment, three distinct periods were selected for deeper analysis. The findings presented in this article reflect the relational evidence corresponding specifically to the period indicated in the title, focused on the Central African region during 2016.
Although SciVortex Corp performs a rapid human-led curation to validate the analytical integrity of the outputs, the information presented here is not independently fact-checked at the source level. Additional source verification is strongly recommended if the content is used for legal, journalistic, or policy purposes.
This text was automatically generated by a Large Language Model (LLM) to provide structured analytical insights based on empirical media content processed through ARCON and modeled using VORISOMA (Vortex Intelligence Software for Observation of Macro-criminality), both developed and maintained by SciVortex Corp. The content does not represent, reflect, or imply the views, positions, or endorsements of SciVortex Corp., the OCCVI initiative, project participants, affiliated institutions, human trainers, or developers of the underlying AI model.
Introduction
In 2022, West Africa witnessed a surge in political instability. Coups, contested elections, and deteriorating security conditions gave way to a new model of governance—one where public contracts became tools for consolidating military power and financing protection networks.
ARCON’s evidence reveals a regional pattern: procurement was militarized, oversight neutralized, and corruption normalized under emergency frameworks. This is not governance failure—it is criminal governance, where institutions exist not to regulate but to redistribute power and resources among elite-military coalitions.
Background: Instability as Operating Environment
Burkina Faso and Mali underwent military takeovers, while Nigeria struggled with endemic insecurity and electoral turbulence. In this context, state functions were reshaped to serve political-military alliances.
ARCON records show how these environments were instrumentalized, allowing elites to invoke national emergencies as justification for opaque contracting, security exemptions, and restricted media access.
Rather than paralyzing state operations, instability became a logic for accelerating elite consolidation.
Network Dynamics: Contracts for Loyalty and Control
ARCON maps a web of interactions connecting military authorities, procurement officials, and private contractors:
In Burkina Faso, military leaders awarded fuel and food supply contracts to newly created firms tied to political patrons. These contracts were fast-tracked using emergency decrees, bypassing procurement laws.
In Mali, ARCON reveals that infrastructure projects—particularly road construction and telecommunications—were assigned to firms aligned with transitional government insiders. Some of these companies had prior links to arms smuggling routes.
In Nigeria, state security budgets were fragmented across agencies, with multiple contracts issued to “ghost vendors”. ARCON highlights overlaps between contractors for election logistics and private militias accused of voter intimidation.
These networks were sustained not just by money, but by coercion, loyalty, and regional complicity.
Institutional Co-optation: States of Exception as Norm
Across the region, ARCON identifies a functional shift in oversight institutions:
Budget review committees were suspended or made symbolic through executive restructuring.
Anti-corruption agencies were instructed to “cooperate with national stability priorities,” effectively silencing inquiries.
In several documented cases, local officials who opposed irregular contracts were reassigned or threatened with disciplinary proceedings.
Public institutions were not dismantled—they were instrumentally paralyzed.
Victimization: Judges, Journalists, and the Silenced Majority
Victimization in 2022 took multiple forms:
Judges in Nigeria and Burkina Faso who attempted to block illegal contract approvals were placed under investigation.
Civil society organizations were denied operating licenses or targeted under anti-terror laws for “undermining national cohesion.”
Local leaders and citizens in conflict-affected areas suffered from collapsed service delivery as budgets were redirected to military suppliers and proxy firms.
ARCON categorizes these harms as multi-level repression, where physical insecurity is layered with legal exclusion and institutional co-optation.
Closing Reflections: The Infrastructure of Illegitimacy
West Africa in 2022 reminds us that corruption is not always concealed—it can be overt, legal, and popular when framed as necessary for survival. ARCON’s evidence underscores how emergency governance can be weaponized, enabling criminal networks to rule through contracts, coercion, and control over fragmented institutions.
If stability is the justification, governance without accountability becomes the cost, and victims become statistics in reports never published.
